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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DAVID E. HOWARD, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
TOWN OF NORTH SALT LAKE, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8106 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a proceeding for the restriction of 
corporate limits taken under the provisions of Chapter 4, 
Title 15, U. C. A. 1943, now Chapter 4, Title 10, U. C. A. 
1953. The appellant, Town of North Salt Lake, will be 
designated herein as the "Town". Respondents are real 
property owners whose premises were disconnected from 
the town by decree of the trial court. They will be desig-
nated herein as the "Petitioners". Emphasis has been sup-
plied. 
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Only two questions are presented on this appeal, 
namely, ( 1) Did the requisite number of real property 
owners join in the petition for disconnection, and (2) Did 
justice and equity require the disconnection. The Trial 
Court resolved each of these questions in the affirmative, 
and decree of disconnection was entered. 
Petitioners believe that a proper determination of 
these issues requires at the outset a full presentation of 
the facts. In our opinion, the statement of the town is not 
sufficient for such purposes. We have, therefore, made a 
statement of all facts which we believe to be pertinent to 
each issue. In order to assist the Court, we have also at-
tached to this brief two maps, one showing the area of the 
town prior to the annexation involved and the area covered 
by the annexation, and the other showing the area of the 
town after disconnection and the area disconnected by the 
decree of the Trial Court. 
Facts Respecting First Issue 
The facts with respect to this issue are not in dispute 
and not drawn into question by the points relied upon by 
the town. The record references to such facts will, there-
fore, be to the findings of the Trial Court. 
On April 21, 1952, the town by ordinance annexed an 
area embracing substantially in excess of 3440 acres con-
tiguous to its westerly and northerly boundary lines. On 
or about the 7th day of August, 1952, petitioners, under 
the provisions of said Chapter 4, filed their petition in the 
District Court of Davis County, praying for the disconnec-
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tion from the town of a portion of the territory so annexed 
by said ordinance and alleging in substance 
(a) The passage of the annexation ordinance 
of April 21, 1952, 
(b) That the petitioners constituted a major-
ity of the real property owners of the territory 
sought to be disconnected, and 
(c) That justice and equity required the dis-
connection of the territory, particularly described, 
upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in 
the petition. 
A description of the area sought to be disconnected was set 
forth in said petition with map attached, and parties were 
designated to act for the petitioners as required by said 
Section 10-4-1, U. C. A. 1953. 
Notice of the filing of said petition with a copy thereof 
was duly served on the town and publication made as re-
quired by said section. The town made and filed its answer 
in the proceedings. 
The matter came on for trial before the Court on De-
cember 18, 1952. Prior to the introduction of any evidence, 
written motions were presented to the Court signed indi-
vidually by fifteen persons alleging that each was a real 
property owner within the territory sought to be discon-
nected and praying for leave to intervene as a plaintiff 
and petitioner in support of the petition on file. Over the 
objection of the town, these motions were granted, and 
such parties were permitted to intervene and become plain-
tiffs and petitioners in support of the petition. 
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Upon the hearing in the case, unusual and difficult 
problems were presented to the Trial Court in reaching a 
determination as to who were real property owners of the 
territory sought to be disconnected within the meaning of 
said Chapter 4. 
Within the territory sought to be disconnected, there 
were two old subdivisions designated as Sulphur Springs 
Addition and North Salt Lake, Plat B. These subdivisions 
were platted prior to statehood. At the time of the trial, 
and for many years prior thereto, however, these had been 
only paper subdivisions for the reason that no streets, side-
walks, or alleys were open or laid out upon the ground, no 
homes or other structures had been built upon any of the 
lots within the area. No fences had been constructed or lot 
boundaries established, and the entire subdivided area was 
simply open grazing land no different from the surrounding 
territory. Subsequent to platting, lots had been sold within 
these subdivisions. Most of these lots had, prior to trial, 
been acquired by Davis County under general tax sale pro-
ceedings, and had been sold to Bountiful Livestock Com-
pany, and were being used by that Company for grazing 
purposes. The general ownership plats in the Office of the 
County Recorder did not show the individual ownership 
of lots within these subdivisions, and petitioners were not 
apprised of such ownerships from an examination of such 
ownership plats. However, Gordon Gurr, a licensed ab-
stracter, who made a title search of the entire territory 
sought to be disconnected in preparation for trial, deter-
mined from a careful examination of the records that there 
were still eleven individuals owning one or more lots in 
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these subdivisions. The area embraced in all these lots was 
insignificant in relation to the whole territory sought to be 
disconnected. The Trial Court concluded, however, that 
each of these eleven parties was a real property owner 
within the meaning of the statute and should be counted 
as such (R. 75). 
On the extreme westerly side of the territory sought 
to be disconnected, lying near the Jordan River, was a 15 
acre parcel which had theretofore been owned by one Mar-
garet Ann Reed Rudy. Title search showed that she was 
dead, and that this parcel had been distributed in proceed-
ings in her estate to twelve individuals. No further evi-
dence of ownership relative to this parcel appeared of 
record. However, search conducted by petitioners, in an 
effort to establish actual ownership, showed that at the 
time of trial, there were twenty-four individual members 
of the Rudy family owning fractional undivided interests 
in this parcel. The Trial Court concluded that even though 
the interest of these individuals was fractional and small, 
each must be counted as a real property owner under the 
statute (R. 76). 
The Trial Court was also confronted in certain in-
stances, with cases in which the record owner had sold a 
parcel under contract, and was under the necessity of de-
termining who was the owner within the meaning of the 
statute. In such cases, the Trial Court concluded that a 
purchaser under an effective contract was the real property 
owner within the meaning of the statute, and should be 
counted as such (R. 78-79). 
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The territory affected by the proceedings was traversed 
by easements of various kinds held by The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, Wasatch Gas Company, 
Utah Oil Refining Company, and Utah Power and Light 
Company. The Trial Court concluded that each of these 
easement holders must be counted as a real property owner 
under the statute, even though the easement did not, in some 
instances, give the holder thereof dominion over or exclusive 
right to any portion of the surface of the premises (R. 
79-80). 
In addition to the foregoing, there were problems aris-
ing from ownerships held by trustees, devisees, tax titles 
held by Davis County in its governmental capacity, and 
the ownership held by Salt Lake City in its proprietary 
capacity of some 570 acres in the territory involved. All 
of these problems were finally resolved by the Trial Court, 
and none of its determinations are objected to by the town 
on this appeal (R. 76-80). 
In the final phases of the trial, in order to assist the 
Court in resolving the questions of ownership herein set 
forth, both the petitioners and the town prepared exhibits 
setting forth their respective theories and claims respecting 
the number and names of the real property owners within 
the territory. Under the computation of the petitioners, 
there were eighty-two owners, and under that of the town, 
ninety owners (R. 80). 
The Trial Court considered the contentions of the 
parties and after resolving the questions as herein set forth, 
finally found and concluded that there were actually eighty-
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six real property owners within the meaning of the statute 
in the territory involved (R. 82). 
In the opinion of the Trial Court, the real property 
owners who were permitted to intervene prior to the com-
mencement of the trial, stood in precisely the same posi-
tion as other real property owners, and should, in all re-
spects, be treated as though they had signed the petition 
in the first instance. Of the fifteen so permitted to inter-
vene, the Trial Court found that fourteen were real prop-
erty owners within the meaning of the statute (R. 83). 
Of those signing the petition in the first instance, the 
Trial Court found that forty-one were real property owners 
within the meaning of the statute, these to be treated in 
all respects the same as the fourteen intervening property 
owners ( R. 83) . 
Counting the interveners and the initial signers, and 
treating ther.ll in all respects the same, there were accord-
ingly fifty-five real property owners joining in the petition, 
or a clear majority of the eighty-six owners found by the 
Court (R. 84). 
Wholly apart from numerical ownerships and consid-
ering the representation on an area basis alone, it is sig-
nificant to observe that the owners of more than 95% of 
the territory involved joined in the petition for disconnec-
tion (R. 84). 
The Trial Court found, and there is no suggestion to 
the contrary, that the allegations of ownership made in the 
petition as originally filed were made in good faith upon 
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the basis of ownership information then reasonably relied 
upon (R. 83). 
The essential dispute on this issue is whether the Trial 
Court, upon all the evidence being introduced and the issue 
of representation submitted to it for decision, should count 
all parties then before it as petitioners or whether it should 
count only those who signed the petition in the first in-
stance. The town would count only the initial signers. We 
think, as did the Trial Court, that all parties should be 
counted and treated alike. 
. Facts Respecting Second Issue 
The facts with respect to the issue of justice and 
·equity fall under two problems. The one has to do with 
municipal services which the town was rendering for the 
benefit of the territory involved relating to such functions 
as water supply, fire protection, police protection, roads, 
and the like. The other relates to the contentions of the 
town with respect to the health and welfare of its inhabi-
tants because of the sewage disposal operations and facili-
ties of Salt Lake City. Because there is no substantial 
dispute of the facts relating to the first problem, and there 
is some question of fact on the second problem, we have 
treated these questions in the order indicated above. 
Prior to the annexation of April 21, 1952, the town 
had a population of some 255 persons. It embraced an area 
of approximately 480 acres, which extended along the main 
highway between Salt Lake City and Ogden, the southerly 
boundary line of the town being common with the northerly 
I j 
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boundary line of Salt Lake City. The Annexation Ordin-
ance of April, 1952, brought into the town an area sub-
stantially in excess of 3440 acres. The disparity between 
the area of the town as it existed prior to the annexation 
and that embraced in the town after the annexation is 
graphically shown upon the prints attached to this brief. 
In the annexation of April, 1952, certain parcels of 
land owned by Cudahy Packing Company, Salt Lake Stock-
yards, Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Com-
pany were excluded, forming an island in the center of the 
territory involved, embracing approximately 280 acres. 
This island area is likewise graphically shown upon the 
prints attached to this brief. The reasons which led the 
town to exclude the island area and causing it to annex an 
area more than ten times larger, surrounding the island, 
are not disclosed. 
The petitioners, in their petition for disconnection, did 
not seek to have disconnected from the town the entire area 
which was embraced in the annexation of April 21, 1952, 
but endeavored to proceed along logical and reasonable lines 
permitting the town to retain that portion of the area which 
follows its natural geographical boundaries along and ad-
jacent to the highway. Accordingly, petitioners sought to 
disconnect only that area lying westerly of what they re-
garded as the logical town boundaries, and extending on to 
the Jordan River. The area sought to be excluded embraced 
approximately 3440 acres. No part of this territory was 
included in the original limits of the town nor embraced 
therein at any time prior to the annexation of April, 1952. 
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After the annexation of April, 1952, the area then in-
cluded in the town may be divided generally and logically 
into two classifications, namely, higher land located along 
and near the main highway and a short distance westerly 
thereof, and lower land extending from a point westerly 
of the highway to the Jordan River. The territory sought 
to be disconnected included substantially all of the lower 
land, while the remaining area included substantially all 
of the higher land. The land sought to be disconnected is 
largely of a low, swampy character with high water tables, 
parts of the area being usually covered with surface water 
during the late winter and early spring. Portions of said 
territory are suitable for farming, and have, in prior years, 
been used for that purpose. Most of the area, however, is 
now, and for many years, has been used for the purpose 
of grazing livestock. During a period of some five years 
prior to trial, industrial concerns including those engaging 
in oil refining and related activities have purchased land 
and established industries within the territory involved. 
The plants and facilities of these companies are located 
principally near the easterly line of the territory involved, 
accessible to railroad trackage. At the time of trial, about 
one-third of the area involved was owned by industrial 
companies, though a substantial portion of the land so 
owned was not then being occupied or devoted to industrial 
purposes (R. 74-84-85). 
There were only six homes located upon the territory 
disconnected. The logical and likely area for the develop-
ment and expansion of residential construction in the gen-
eral area lies within the town boundaries as they were re-
1 r1 
II : tl 
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stricted by the disconnection and northerly and easterly of 
such boundaries. Within such area, there is ample room 
for any presently foreseeable dwelling requirements of 
the town. The future growth and expansion of the town 
will not require the area sought to be disconnected, and 
such area is not necessary for the use of the town (R. 85-
88). 
With the exception of the two old subdivisions herein 
referred to, no part of the territory involved has been 
subdivided. No streets or alleys existed in those subdivi-
sions. The only road completely traversing the disconnected 
territory at the time of trial was Cudahy Lane. One lane 
extended from the limits of the town as they existed prior 
to April, 1952, in a westerly direction to the center of Sec-
tion 10, Township 1 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Merid-
ian. There was but one lane traversing the territory in a 
north and south direction. At the time of trial, an industrial 
highway had been surveyed, and bids for its construction 
let, but actual work had not yet begun. This industrial 
highway would extend through a portion of the westerly 
part of the disconnected territory. Cudahy Lane had been 
surfaced in part, and the town during 1952, had expended 
some funds on the maintenance of this road. A part of such 
expenditure may have been applied to that portion of the 
road lying within the disconnected territory. Apart from 
the expenditure on said Cudahy Lane, there was no sub-
stantial expenditure in the maintenance of roads by the 
town; and except for said Cudahy Lane, there were no im-
proved streets within the territory. There were no side-
walks, curbs or gutters within the area involved (R. 85). 
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The town had no fire department ; and ever since its 
organization, the town has relied upon the fire fighting 
facilities of Davis County for fire protection. The town 
could not afford any substantial fire protection to any of 
the property owners within the disconnected area. Salt 
Lake Refining Company, one of the industrial concerns in 
the disconnected area, had, at its substantial expense, pur-
chased its own fire fighting equipment, and was constantly 
engaged in a program for the training of its personnel in 
refinery fire fighting methods. Because of the peculiar 
hazards in oil refinery fires, this owner would not permit 
anyone but skilled firemen within its premises in event of 
a fire (R. 86). 
The only police protection provided by the town was 
afforded through a marshal. The owners of grazing lands, 
comprising most of the area sought to be disconnected, re-
quire no police protection other than that afforded by the 
sheriff of Davis County; and the industries located within 
the disconnected area, were receiving, and would receive, 
no substantial benefit from the police protection afforded 
by the town (R. 86). 
The water supply of the town at the time of trial came 
from certain springs and wells and was sufficient only to 
supply the requirements of the inhabitants of the town as 
it was constituted prior to April 21, 1952, and the require-
ments of those inhabitants of that part of the territory 
annexed by the ordinance of that date not affected by these 
proceedings. Those industries conducting operations within 
the disconnected territory and requiring substantial quan-
tities of water have been under the necessity of acquiring 
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their supply from other sources. Salt Lake Refining Com-
pany, which consumes a large quantity of water, obtains 
its supply from Salt Lake City and from wells. The owners 
of agricultural and grazing lands in the territory involved 
do not presently need any additional supply of water. Their 
requirements at the time of hearing and for many years 
prior thereto, had been satisfied through wells. The town 
has made application for additional water supply from the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. Independent 
applications for water from the same source have been 
made by certain of the industries in the area involved. If 
and when the Water Conservancy District is completed, the 
town should have available additional supplies of water. 
Industries which have made like applications will, however, 
have independent water supplies from the same source. The 
development of water from this source is dependent upon 
Congressional appropriation, and some years subsequent to 
the trial date will probably elapse before such water will 
actually be delivered to the area (R. 87). 
The town was organized as herein shown in 1946. No 
part of the territory disconnected by the decree of the Trial 
Court was then included in the area of the town or included 
therein at any time prior to the annexation of April, 1952. 
Between 1946 and April, 1952, certain industries, particu-
larly those relating to petroleum refining, purchased lands 
in Davis County outside and westerly of the then corporate 
limits of the town, and established their plants and facili-
ties upon such premises. It was not until the establishment 
of these industries that the annexation of April, 1952, oc-
curred. The creation and establishment of the town was, 
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however, entirely unrelated to the location and establish-
ment of these industries (R. 87-88). 
There are no schools or churches within the town, and 
there is no community relationship or dependency between 
any of the property owners in the area sought to be dis-
connected and the town. The water supply of the town as 
herein shown is not related to the water supply of the in-
dividual property owners or the industries within the dis-
connected area. Highway traffic to and from a large por-
tion of the disconnected area does not actually pass through 
the town. Thus, Salt Lake Refining Company, one of the 
principal industries in the disconnected area, in order to 
obtain access to its premises, built at its cost and expense 
roads leading southerly from its plant to connect with the 
streets of Salt Lake City. All highway traffic to and from 
this plant passes over this road and onto streets of Salt 
Lake City or State highways before any such traffic may 
reach a street within the town. Of some two hundred per-
sons employed by this industry, only one employee, at the 
time of trial, resided within the town of North Salt Lake. 
The town has a post office, but none of the mail of this 
Company is either received or deposited at this post office. 
The dependency upon and relationship of the industries to 
a municipality is with Salt Lake City, rather than the town. 
The property disconnected by the decree of the Trial Court 
received no direct or special benefits resulting from the 
exercise of the powers granted to the town (R. 88). 
Consideration will now be given to the second phase 
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alleges that the health and welfare of its inhabitants re-
quires that the annexed area remain within the town. 
This allegation relates to the disposition of sewage. 
Certain of the facts in connection with this matter are 
not in dispute. The southerly portion of the premises in-
volved is cut through with sewer lines, ditches, and canals. 
The sewage of Salt Lake City reaches the territory in ques-
tion through two closed conduits. Both these conduits empty 
into an open sewer canal. One conduit carrying sewage by 
gravity empties into the east end of the open canal at a 
point about 600 feet west of the center of Section 11, the 
other conduit carrying pumped sewage empties into the 
open canal near the center of Section 10. The open canal 
extends westerly from said point in Section 11 about 11t4 
miles where it passes under the Jordan River. It then runs 
north along the west bank of the river about 8 miles and 
empties into Great Salt Lake. Salt Lake City has employed 
this method of sewage disposal for many years, commenc-
ing long prior to the organization of the town. 
At a time some years prior to the hearing date, a dam 
had been constructed in said sewer canal, and the waters 
diverted for the purpose of irrigating lands within the 
disconnected area. This dive-rsion had been stopped some 
time prior to hearing date, the outlet of the dam effectively 
blocked, and there was no evidence or indication at the time 
of the trial that sewage water would, in the future, be used 
to irrigate any of the lands in the area sought to be dis-
connected. 
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The course of the Salt Lake City open sewer canal is 
likewise shown upon the prints attached to this brief. 
The evidence at the trial dealt primarily with the ex-
istence of the 114 miles of open sewer canal within the area 
annexed by the town under the ordinance of April, 1952, 
and the possible health hazard to the inhabitants of the town 
from the existence of the canal. 
From the evidence, these propositions are established: 
(a) The problem of sewage disposal of the 
cities, towns, and communities along the Wasatch 
front from the southerly end of Utah County to the 
northerly end of Weber County because of ultimate 
drainage into Great Salt Lake is a problem which 
must be approached on an over-all basis, and should 
not be treated piece-meal (R. 489-90). 
(b) Salt Lake City is presently engaged in a 
sewage disposal program which will result in the 
construction and operation of a sewage treatment 
disposal plant or plants, and eliminate the existence 
of the sewer canal herein referred to, and the dis-
charge of raw sewage into Great Salt Lake (R. 
495-96). 
The sewer canal of Salt Lake City is unsightly. The 
practice Salt Lake City employed at the time of trial, and 
for many years prior thereto, of disposing of its sewage 
by discharging the same into Great Salt Lake is no longer 
an up-to-date method of sewage disposal. There is some 
medical evidence that the existence of the sewer canal is 
a potential hazard to the health of the inhabitants of the 
surrounding area. However, in view of the program of 
Salt Lake City now going forward for sewage disposal, it 
. I 
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would in the opinion of a witness for the town be an un-
necessary and unwise expenditure for Salt Lake City to pay 
the amount necessary to enclose in a conduit or other pipe 
that portion of the sewer canal located within the limits of 
the town as they were extended by the ordinance of April, 
1952 (R. 495-496, 504). 
Quite obviously, there could be no interruption of the 
sewage disposal of Salt Lake City. The method of disposal 
employed at the time of trial had been used for many years 
prior to the organization of the town. Until a new method 
of disposal is placed in operation, the old method must nec-
essarily be used. This is so whether the territory involved 
is annexed to or disconnected from the town. The matter 
of the sewage disposal by Salt Lake City is accordingly a 
problem separate and apart from the question of the an-
nexation or disconnection of the territory involved. 
On the entire question of justice and equity, the Trial 
Court, therefore found that these principles did not require 
that the territory remain a part of the town and concluded 
that it should be disconnected. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
A MAJORITY OF THE REAL PROPERTY 
OWNERS OF THE TERRITORY INVOLVED 
SIGNED THE PETITION FOR DISCONNEC-
TION AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE. 
(a) The District Court had Jurisdiction. 
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(b) The Power of the District Court to Proceed 
is Invoked by the Allegations of the Petition. 
(c) The Proceedings before the Court are Ex-
pressly Controlled by the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
(d) The Question of Whether the Requisite 
Number of Real Property Owners Join in 
the Petition for Disconnection Must Be De-
termined as of the Time That Issue is Passed 
Upon by the Court. 
(e) The Statute Requires a Determination of the 
Issue Involved Upon the Basis of the Facts 
and Law at the Time of Trial. 
(f) Those Who Intervened Became Parties for 
all Purposes to the Same Extent as though 
They Had Signed the Petition in the First 
Instance. 
POINT II. 
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE 
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED 
FROM THE TOWN. 
(a) No direct or special Benefit was received 
by the Disconnected Area resulting from the 
Exercise of the Powers of the Town. 
(b) The future Growth and Expansion of the 
Town Will Not Require the Disconnected 
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Territory, nor is it Necessary for the Use of 
the Town. 
(c) There is no Interrelation or Dependency be-
tween the Disconnected Territory and the 
Town. 
(d) The Health and Welfare of the Residents of 
the Town do not Require that the Discon-
nected Territory Remain a Part of the Town. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A MAJORITY OF THE REAL PROPERTY 
OWNERS OF THE TERRITORY INVOLVED 
SIGNED THE PETITION FOR DISCONNEC-
TION AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE. 
(a) The District Court had Jurisdiction. 
In its brief, the town contends that the court was with-
out jurisdiction to grant the relief of disconnection. This 
contention requires a consideration of the fundamental 
nature of jurisdiction. 
The term "jurisdiction" is one which is often loosely 
and improperly applied. We are not here concerned with 
jurisdiction of the court over any person. Our problem re-
lates to jurisdiction over the subject matter. Accurately 
stated, such jurisdiction is the right to adjudicate concern-
ing the subject matter in a given case. It is the power, 
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lawfully conferred, to deal with the general subject involved 
in the action. See 14 Am. Jur. Courts, Section 160. 
Here the subject matter involved is the restriction of 
the corporate limits of the town. Power to deal with this 
subject matter was expressly conferred upon the District 
Courts under the Constitution of the State of Utah and by 
the provisions of the said Chapter 4, Title 10, U. C. A. 
1953. 
This court in Young, et al. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 
321, 67 P. 1066, expressly held that this power was lawfully 
conferred. Clearly, then, the District Court had jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of this case. 
The cases cited in the brief of the town do not compel 
any contrary result. A careful reading of Young, et al. v. 
Salt Lake City, supra, and Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 
212, 66 P. 2d 1195, discloses no holding to the effect that 
the district court is not vested with jurisdiction over the 
subject matter involved in this case. 
In its brief, the town contends that the court below 
was without jurisdiction to grant the relief of disconnec-
tion for the reason that the petition, as originally filed, did 
not physically contain the signatures of 50% of the total 
number of property owners as ultimately determined by 
the court. 
To support this contention, the town cites authorities 
on two basic propositions, neither of which is contested by 
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petitioners herein, and neither of which is determinative 
of the issues in this case. These propositions are : 
(a) That the creation of a city and the fixing 
of its boundaries is essentially a legislative and not 
a judicial function. 
(b) That there must be a compliance with 
statutory conditions before territory may be de-
tached from a city. 
Authorities need hardly be cited to support either of 
these propositions as stated. It is the meaning and appli-
cation of the latter proposition, however, which is critical 
in the instant case. The town maintains that this rule, 
as applied to this case, requires that the percentage of 
property owners specified in the statute must affix their 
signatures to the petition before the same is filed in the 
court. Yet, the only applicable authorities cited in support 
of such a contention are cases in which it was found that 
the required number of property owners were not present 
in any fashion before the court or administrative body in-
volved. This is a very different proposition from the one 
contended for by the town, and petitioners agree that, if 
such were the case here, the court would not have been 
authorized by the statute to order the disconnection ap-
pealed from. 
In this case, however, a majority of the property own-
ers were before the court during the trial of the issues 
raised by the petition and long before the sufficiency of 
said petition was determined. We will show in this brief 
that, under such circumstances, the court had jurisdiction 
to decree a disconnection. 
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(b) The Power of the District Court to Proceed 
is Invoked by the Allegations of the Petition. 
Having found that the court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the restriction of corporate boundariest 
we must inquire as to how this jurisdiction is exercised. 
This becomes a procedural matter. The said chapter sets 
forth the requirements of this procedure; namely, the filing 
of a petition in a certain form with certain allegations. A 
petition with the requisite statutory allegations was filed 
in the present case. Under the allegations of such a peti-
tion, and upon the filing of the same, the court is author-
ized to exercise the power conferred upon it by the statute. 
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine comes 
from the grant of powers over the subject matter. The 
exercise of that power is set in motion by the petition. The 
jurisdiction of the court in such a case can be tested by a 
motion to dismiss. Assume that prior to hearing the town 
had filed a motion to dismiss based upon a jurisdictional 
ground. The motion would most surely be denied for the 
obvious reason that under the petition the court had the 
power to hear and determine the case. 
The principles here stated have many times been rec-
ognized by the courts. We believe it unnecessary to extend 
this brief by citations on this proposition. Typical of the 
many cases which have so held is that of Malden Trust Com-
pany v. Brooks (Mass.) 177 N. E. 629, 80 A. L. R. 1028. 
The facts in that case were that prior to 1929, the Probate 
Courts of Massachusetts had no equity jurisdiction. In 
1929, an amendment was passed to the statute extending 
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the jurisdiction of probate courts to certain equity matters, 
and providing that such jurisdiction might be exercised 
upon petition according to the usual course of procedure 
in probate courts. A petition was filed, and an answer made 
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. In holding that 
the allegations of the petition entitled the court to proceed 
and must be taken as true for that purpose, the court said 
in part: 
It is for a court with jurisdiction in equity to de-
termine whether or not the obligation has been ful-
filled. If the allegations of the petition are proved, 
the appellants will be found to be holding in trust, 
by reason of Brooks' breach of fiduciary duty, a fund 
to which the petitioner and the beneficiaries under 
the will of Carlos E. Ball are entitled. That the 
quoted statute, supra, gives jurisdiction to the pro-
bate court to ascertain the facts in support of the 
allegations of the petition is not open to serious 
question. 
So in the case at bar, the district court was entitled to 
proceed upon the allegations as set forth in the petition. 
The proof of these allegations became an issue which the 
court was bound to determine; and as we will hereafter 
point out, the time for the proof of these issues was at the 
trial of the case when submitted to the court for its de-
termination. 
(c) The Proceedings before the Court are Ex-
pressly Controlled by the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
The said Section 10-4-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides, among 
other things, that 
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Issue shall be joined and the cause tried as provided 
for the trial of civil causes as nearly as may be. 
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
paragraph (a) thereof, among other things, that 
These rules shall govern the procedure in the su-
preme court, the district courts, city courts, and 
justice courts of the State of Utah, in all actions, 
suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cog-
nizable at law or in equity, and in all special stat-
utory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They 
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action. 
Rule 81 makes no exception for proceedings taken for 
the restriction of corporate limits. 
Rule 20 dealing with the permissive joinder of parties 
in paragraph (a) provides among other things that 
All persons may be joined in one action as defen-
dants if there is asserted against them jointly, sev-
erally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in 
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences 
and if any question of law or fact common to all of 
them will arise in the action. 
Rule 21 dealing with misjoinder and non-joinder of 
parties provides in part that 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of 
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order 
of the court on motion of any party or of its own 
initative at any stage of the action and on such terms 
as are just. 
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Rule 24 dealing with intervention in paragraph (a) 
provides in part that 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted 
to intervene in an action: ( 1) when a statute con-
fers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) 
when the representation of the applicant's interest 
by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the 
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action * * * 
From the foregoing provisions, it is clearly seen that 
the proceeding here involved is one which is controlled by 
the rules of civil procedure; that these rules are designed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action ; that parties may be added or dropped and 
parties may intervene where the representation of the ap-
plicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inade-
quate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment 
in the action. It seems to us that this is the clearest kind 
of a case for intervention. 
(d) The Question of Whether the Requisite 
Number of Real Property Owners Join in 
the Petition for Disconnection Must Be De-
termined as of the Time That Issue is Passed 
Upon by the Court. 
The question of whether the requisite number of real 
property owners joined in the petition for disconnection is 
one of the issues of the case. Petitioners are convinced that 
essentially this is no different from the issue of justice and 
equity. Each is a condition which the statute imposes to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
a disconnection of territory from a municipality, and each 
must be found affirmatively before a valid decree of dis-
connection may be entered. 
The town contends that the issue of representation 
must be found on the basis of the facts as determined from 
the petition initially filed with the court. 
In the view of petitioners, this position is clearly erron-
eous. We believe the critical time for the determination 
of the issue of representation is the time when that issue 
is submitted to the trial court for decision. The propriety 
of this rule may be tested by a simple example. Let us 
assume a case in which the ultimate facts were found to be 
the other way from the case at bar. Suppose a petition 
were filed signed by 100 real property owners. Upon the 
trial and before the introduction of any evidence, 15 of 
these by appropriate motions withdrew their names, and 
by order were dropped as petitioners. Upon the final de-
termination of the issue of representation, the trial court 
found that the remaining 85 did not constitute the requisite 
number although the 100 were a clear majority. Under 
the rule urged by the town, the trial court would be bound 
to find that a majority of the real property -owners signed 
the petition and the petitioners entitled to pr~vail ~n the 
iss.ue of representation. Quite obviously, however, this 
would be erroneous because when the issue of representa-
tion was submitted to and determined by the court, there 
were not a majority of the real property owners in sup-
port of the petition before it. 
The princi pie here involved was considered by this 
court in the case of Halgren v. Welling, 91 Utah 16, 63 P. 
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2d 550. This was a mandamus proceeding brought against 
the Secretary of State to compel him to give effect to certain 
withdrawal petitions and to eliminate from the initiative 
petition the names of the withdrawing parties. The facts 
were that the initiative petition as originally filed with the 
Secretary of State contained the signatures of the requisite 
number of voters; but before the petition was acted upon, 
certain of the petitioners withdrew, reducing the signers 
below the required number. The question was therefore 
squarely presented as to whether the petitioners were en-
titled to withdraw prior to the petition being acted upon 
and the effect of such withdrawal. The court, after care-
fully considering the entire problem and citing many cases, , 
held that a petitioner could withdraw prior to the petition 
being acted upon, and where such withdrawal reduced the 
number of petitioners below the statutory requirements, the 
petition must fail. (Reaffirmed in Allan v. Rasmussen, 
101 Utah 33, 117 P. 2d 287.) 
So in the case at bar, it is the representation before 
the court at the time when that issue is submitted to the 
court for determination which controls. If at that time, 
the requisite number of real property owners are before 
the court, the petitioners on that issue are entitled to pre-
vail, otherwise not. 
Another helpful case, closely in point on the facts and 
completely analogous in principle, is First National Bank, 
et al. v. Village of South Pekin, 25 N. E. 2d 87. The Illinois 
statute involved was similar to the Utah statute insofar as 
the function of the court was concerned, though the grounds 
upon which disconnection was required to be based were 
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different. Under said statute, petitioners for disconnection 
were required to allege, among other things, that the area 
to be disconnected contained 20 or more acres. The statute 
then provided, as does the Utah statute, as follows: 
If the court finds that the allegations of said peti-
tion are true * * * it shall order said land dis-
connected * * * 
Suit was brought to disconnect four tracts of land, one 
of which contained only 13.40 acres. Petitions in interven-
tion were allowed as to three additional tracts of land, each 
of which contained less than 5 acres of land. The effect 
of the intervention, however, was to join tracts with less 
than the twenty acre limit to larger tracts so that contig-
uous tracts made "areas" larger than twenty acres. All of 
the tracts were disconnected by the trial court. 
The "device" of intervention was attacked in that case 
as it is being attacked here, but the intermediate court up-
held the trial court on two grounds, viz., that general pro-
cedural law governed statutory proceedings unless the stat-
ute specified otherwise, and that the law does not encourage 
a multiplicity of suits when the same effect could be ac-
complished in one suit. The intermediate appellate court, 
however, construed the statute as requiring that each tract 
must contain 20 acres and reversed the decree as to the 
four tracts containing less. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, at 29 N. E. 2d 590, re-
versed this interpretation of the statute and reinstated the 
decree of the trial court. This holding, it is to be noted, is 
directly in line with petitioner's contentions herein. But 
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for the petitions in intervention, the allegations of the orig-
inal petitioners could not have been found to be true. 
(e) The Statute Requires a Determination of the 
Issue Involved Upon the Basis of the Facts 
and Law at the Time of Trial. 
Not only do the decisions which have considered this 
problem hold that the critical time for the determination 
of representation is the time of trial, but a careful consid-
eration of the statute itself compels the same result. 
Section 10-4-2 U. C. A. 1953, provides that: 
If the court finds that the petition was signed by 
a majority of the real property owners of the terri-
tory concerned and that the allegations of the peti-
tion are true and that justice and equity require that 
such territory or any part thereof should be dis-
connected from such city or town, it shall appoint 
three disinterested persons as commissioners to ad-
just the terms upon which such part shall be so 
severed as to any liabilities of such city or town that 
have accrued during the connection of such part with 
the corporation, and as to the mutual property rights 
of the city or town and the territory to be detached. 
At first blush these provisions may seem to support 
the contentions of the town. This section, however, must 
be read in the light of the principles which we have found 
to be controlling in these cases, and when so read it is seen 
that the statute actually requires a determination of the 
issue of representation as of the time the court is called 
upon to make that determination and not at some prior 
time when the petition was first signed or filed. 
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Consider first the provisions relating to the signing 
of the petition. The town contends that this language re-
lates to the initial signing of the petition. The statute does 
not so provide, the language is simply 
If the court finds that the petition was signed by 
a majority of the real property owners of the terri-
tory concerned * * * 
There is no provision or requirement in this Section 
that the petition must be signed by a majority at the time 
it is first filed with the court. The plain implication of this 
language is that the petition must be signed by a majority 
of the real property owners at the time the court finds upon 
the issue of representation. This construction is essential 
in order to permit the court to consider the effect of those 
who may have withdrawn their names before the issue 
of representation was submitted and likewise those who 
may have signed the petition after the same was filed. 
Considering first the matter of withdrawing owners, 
under the example which we have heretofore employed, 
would anyone seriously contend that under the above quoted 
statute, the trial court should find that 100 property owners 
ultimately signed the petition. The finding of the court 
must necessarily be that 85 property owners had signed 
the petition under the facts as they existed upon the matter 
being submitted to the court for decision. Conversely, if 
property owners signed after the petition was filed, then 
the court in its findings must consider all of such property 
owners as signers at the time it is called upon to make its 
findings and determination. Such a construction gives rec-
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ognition to the principles which control these proceedings 
and the effect of the rules of civil procedure under which 
they are conducted. 
This leaves only the matter of what constitutes a sign-
ing of the petition within the meaning of the statute. It is 
conceivable that upon this case being called for trial on the 
18th of December, 1952, real property owners in addition 
to those who had already signed the petition might have 
been present in open court, and that these parties might 
have requested leave to and been permitted to affix their 
respective signatures to the petition. They would then clear-
ly have signers of the petition. 
Instead of coming into court personally, these parties 
signed and filed separate written instruments in form sub-
stantially as follows : 
Comes now Alpha Volk and moves for leave to 
intervene as a petitioner and plaintiff in this action 
in support of the petition and complaint on file 
herein, upon the ground that she is one of the own-
ers of the real property described in paragraph 
numbered 3 of the complaint and petition on file 
herein; that the statute in such actions confers an 
unconditional right upon Applicant to appear as a 
party petitioner and plaintiff herein; that represen-
tation of Applicant's interest by existing parties 
may be inadequate and Applicant will be bound by 
a judgment in this action. 
Dated this 9th day of December, 1952. 
(Signed) Alpha Volk 
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These instruments were filed in court in accordance 
with the rules of civil procedure. By the execution of these 
instruments, the parties joined in the petitions as plaintiffs 
and petitioners as effectively as though they had affixed 
their signatures to the original petition itself. Their sig-
natures were proved by evidence in the same manner as the 
signatures of all other parties to the petition. They were 
treated by the court and counsel in all respects as though 
they had physically signed the petition. We think there 
can be no doubt that they were within the meaning of said 
statute, signers of the petition. 
(f) Those Who Intervened Became Parties for 
all Purposes to the Same Extent as though 
They Had Signed the Petition in the First 
Instance. 
Rule 24 (a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure is almost 
identical to the Federal Rule of the same number. 
In applying the federal rule, the courts have frequently 
held that an intervener in an action or proceeding is for 
all intents and purposes an original party. 
Thus, in the case of In re Raabe, Glissman & Co., Inc., 
71 F. Supp. 679, a petition was filed by one claiming to be 
a creditor to procure certain funds in a bankrupt estate. 
The petitioner failed to prove that he was a qualified cred-
itor. However, at the hearing, another creditor appeared 
who was qualified. The court held the intervener entitled 
to recover the funds, saying in part : 
Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 28 U. S. C. A. following section 723c, an 
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intervenor in an action or proceeding is, for all 
intents and purposes, an original party. The joinder 
of Ehlerman in the proceedings was proper under 
Rule 24 and would permit the court to retain jur-
isdiction thereof and pass upon his claim even though 
the original petitioner was not a qualified claimant. 
Rule 21, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Hack-
ner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 2 Cir., 117 F. 2d 95. 
See also; Cabot v. Binney & Smith Co., 46 F. Supp. 346; 
Marsh v. United States, 97 F. 2d 327; State of Kansas v. 
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 95 F. 2d 935; Johnson, et al. v. 
United States, 102 F. 2d 729. 
The argument on Point I should not be concluded with-
out considering the actual situation presented at the trial. 
After days of hearing the Trial Court finally had before 
it all the facts relative to ownership and representation, 
as well as those relating to the issue of justice and equity. 
The court determined that a majority of the real property 
owners were before it in support of the petition. What do 
the statute and rules of civil procedure require the court 
to do under these circumstances? The town contends that 
the whole proceeding should have then been dismissed, and 
the parties compelled to go through all the steps necessary 
again to bring the matter before the court. In the j udg-
ment of petitioners, the Trial Court did precisely what the 
statute and the rules require, namely, to adjudicate con-
cerning the subject matter over which it had jurisdiction. 
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POINT II. 
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE 
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED 
FROM THE TOWN. 
The Trial Court found that justice and equity required 
that the territory involved be disconnected from the town. 
The essential que~tion on this appeal under this point is, 
therefore, whether the findings of the Trial Court are sup-
ported by the evidence. Not only are such findings amply 
supported by the evidence, but the facts are for the most 
part not in dispute as will be shown from a consideration of 
the following propositions: 
(a) No direct or special Benefit was received 
by the Disconnected Area resulting from the 
Exercise of the Powers of the Town. 
It is elementary that in the exercise of municipal 
powers, some substantial direct or special benefit must 
be conferred upon territory within a town. Otherwise, it 
is patently unjust and inequitable that the property within 
such territory should be burdened with the taxes imposed 
by the municipality. 
Cities and towns are granted certain powers by the 
legislature. Through the exercise of these powers, they are 
enabled to confer certain direct or special benefits upon 
territory within their corporate limits. It is the conferring 
of these benefits which justify or require the inclusion of 
territory within a town. 
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If these benefits are not substantially conferred, then 
justice and equity require that the territory be relieved of 
the burdens imposed by the town. The special benefits 
which a city or town may confer upon territory within its 
limits relate to such matters as roads, sidewalks, curbs, and 
gutters, sewage facilities, water supply, police protection, 
and fire protection. 
Before an appraisal may be made of the question of 
whether these benefits were conferred upon the territory 
involved in this case, it is necessary again to consider the 
nature of the annexation involved and the extent and char-
acter of the territory affected. These facts are not in dis-
pute. 
As herein shown, the town was organized in 1946. In 
1950, it had a population of some 255 persons. Prior to 
the annexation of April, 1952, it embraced an area of ap-
proximately 480 acres. That annexation covered an area 
substantially in excess of 3440 acres or more than seven 
times the area of the town prior to annexation. The annex-
ation of April, 1952, did not, however, include the premises 
of the Cudahy Packing Company, Salt Lake Stock Yards, 
Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Company. 
The properties of these companies remained as an island 
in the town embracing an area covering some 280 acres 
or more than half the area of the town prior to the annex-
ation. 
The territory of the town as its limits were extended 
by the annexation embraced land falling generally into 
two classifications, namely, higher land and low land. Pe-
titioners did not seek to disconnect from the town all of 
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the territory annexed by the Ordinance of April, 1952. 
Rather, they sought to disconnect only the low land, leav-
ing within the town the higher land, which conformed to 
the geographical boundaries of the town as they existed 
prior to the annexation. 
Turning to a consideration of the lands sought to be 
disconnected, their location and character were shown in 
the statement of facts. At the risk of redundancy, it may 
be pointed out again that they are largely low and swampy 
with high water tables, surfaces often covered with water 
in late winter or early spring. A portion of the area has 
heretofore been used for farming, but at the time of trial, 
the lands were largely used for grazing. Within a period 
of five years prior to trial, certain industries, including 
those engaged in oil refining and related activities, pur-
chased land and established plants within the territory in-
volved. These plants are largely located near the easterly 
side of the area in question, accessible to railroad trackage; 
but even there, substantial fill was required to make the 
land usable. At the time of trial, about a third of the area 
was owned by industrial concerns, but only a part of such 
ownership was actually being used for industrial purposes 
(R. 359-76). 
Considering the municipal benefits and directing at-
tention to the matter of roads, sidewalks, curbs and gutters, 
the facts are not in dispute. At the time of trial, there was 
actually one road running through the area. This was an 
east and west road known as Cudahy Lane, and as its name 
implies, it runs to and primarily serves the packing plant 
and stock yards area which, as herein shown, was never 
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annexed to the town. There were no sidewalks, curbs or 
gutters within the town. In order to gain access to its 
property, Salt Lake Refining Company, one of the principal 
property owners, built its own road connecting its premises 
directly with the streets of Salt Lake City (R. 242-68). 
The water supply of the town is furnished through 
springs and wells. No contention is made in the brief of 
the town that its present supply is more than sufficient 
to supply the requirements of its inhabitants within the 
area as restricted by the disconnection decree of the Trial 
Court. The town furnishes no water whatever for the dis-
connected territory. This territory has been compelled to 
obtain its own water supply. The grazing lands secure their 
water from wells ; other users from wells or outside sources. 
Salt Lake Refining Company, the principal industry within 
the area, obtains its supply from wells and from Salt Lake 
City, through mains constructed at the expense of the in-
dustry (R. 242-68). 
The town is seeking to augment its water supply under 
applications to the Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dis-
trict. So also is Salt Lake Refining Company. If and when 
water becomes available at some future date from this 
source, this industry will have an additional independent 
water supply (R. 335-51). 
The town had no fire department at the time of trial, 
and so far as we are aware, presently has no such depart-
ment. No benefit whatever was conferred upon the terri-
tory involved by the town in this respect. 
As for police protection, the town has a marshal. The 
grazing lands need little or no police protection. The prin-
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cipal oil refining company has never used any such protec-
tion, and prefers to rely upon its own security arrangements 
(R. 295-302). The only service in this regard, pointed out 
in the brief of the town, is the installation of a traffic light 
on U. S. Highway 91, at a point within the limits of the 
town, outside the area affected by these proceedings. Surely 
this is so remote to the territory involved as to be of no 
significance. 
Considering, then, the whole field of direct or special 
benefits which the town conferred or could be expected to 
confer upon the territory involved there is literally nothing 
of any substance or significance to which the town can 
point, and the findings of the Trial Court are beyond dis-
pute. 
(b) The future Growth and Expansion of the 
Town Will Not Require the Disconnected 
Territory, nor is it Necessary for the Use of 
the Town. 
In paragraph 22 of its findings (R. 85) the Trial Court 
found that the growth and expansion of the town did not 
require the disconnected territory and that the same was 
not necessary for the use of the town. 
This finding is not assailed in the brief of the town, 
and it is supported by the evidence. 
The physical facts alone are sufficient to demonstrate 
this proposition. Here involved is an area of more than 
five full sections of land lying at the very back door of 
Salt Lake City. Yet in more than a hundred years after 
the settlement of the surrounding communities, there were 
but six homes in this entire area, four of which were lo-
cated on the very easterly fringe of the disconnected tract. 
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Although the two old subdivisions herein referred to had 
been platted for more than half a century, not one person 
had ventured to build any kind of a dwelling or structure 
thereon. The witness Kiepe, a professional real estate ap-
praiser, in his testimony explained why this low, swampy 
area had not developed and demonstrated that the logical 
ar~a for the development and expansion of the town lay 
within the high ground northerly and easterly of the boun-
daries of the town as they existed prior to the ordinance of 
April, 1952. Within this general area of high ground in the 
south end of Davis County, this witness estimated that 
there was room for 24,000 families (R. 367). It is within 
this area that the logical growth of the town will necessarily 
occur. 
The town had no schools, no churches, no parks or 
public areas, and there is no suggestion in the· record that 
it needed or intended to use any of the disconnected terri-
tory for any of these purposes. Clearly, the findings of the 
Trial Court on this point were properly made. 
(c) There is no Interrelation or Dependency be-
tween the Disconnected Territory and the 
Town. 
A disposition of this point requires an examination 
of the Utah case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 
et al., 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044, cited in the brief of the 
town. 
In that case, petitioners sought disconnection from 
Mammoth City of an area of territory. Disconnection was 
decreed by the trial court. On appeal, this court, in a di-
vided opinion, reversed except as to a small area in the 
west part of the town. 
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On the facts the case is readily distinguished from the 
one at bar. 
In the Mammoth City case, the area involved was a 
part of the town upon its incorporation, and had at all 
times been within the town prior to the commencement of 
the disconnection proceedings. 
Mammoth City was a mining town. The court found 
that if there were no mines operated in the immediate vicin-
ity, the town would never have existed. The municipality 
was organized for the sole purpose of providing homes for 
those who worked in and about the mines located within 
the city and other mines in the vicinity. A large percent 
of the men residing in Mammoth City were employees of 
the mines located within the boundaries of the city. The 
mines located within the boundaries of Mammoth City and 
the municipality itself were entirely tied up together. 
The following findings of the Trial Court in its para-
graph 27 completely distinguish the case at bar from the 
Mammoth City case. 
As hereinabove found, the Town of North Salt 
Lake was organized in 1946. No part of the terri-
tory here sought to be disconnected was then or at 
any time prior to the annexation of April 21, 1952, 
included within the town. Between 1946 and April, 
1952, certain companies, particularly those relating 
to the petroleum industry purchased lands in Davis 
County outside and westerly of the corporate limits 
of the town and established their plants and facili-
ties upon such premises. It was not until the es-
tablishment of these industries that the annexation 
of April 15, 1952, and the subsequent disconnection 
proceedings here involved occurred. · The creation 
and establishment of the town, however was en-
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tirely unrelated to the location and establishment of 
these industries. There are no schools or churches 
within the town, and a careful consideration of all 
the evidence shows no close community relationship 
or dependency between any of the property owners 
in the area sought to be disconnected and the Town 
of North Salt Lake. The most important, from the 
standpoint of property valuation and number of em-
ployees, of such property owners is Salt Lake Refin-
ing Company. The evidence shows, as hereinbefore 
found, that this company was under the necessity of 
securing its water supply primarily from Salt Lake 
City. In order to secure access to its premises, it 
built, at its own cost and expense, a road leading 
from its plant southerly to connect with the streets 
of Salt Lake City. All highway traffic to and from 
its plant passes over this road and onto the streets 
of Salt Lake City or state highways before any such 
traffic may reach a street within the town of North 
Salt Lake. Some two hundred persons are employed 
by Salt Lake Refining Company, but only one of 
these employees at the time of hearing resided with-
in the Town of North Salt Lake. The town has a 
post office but none of the mail,of this company is 
either received or deposited at this post office. The 
dependency upon and relationship of this company 
to a municipality is with Salt Lake City rather than 
the Town of North Salt Lake. 
These findings are based upon undisputed facts. They 
are not assailed in the brief of the town. The facts are 
fully developed by the witnesses Pramme and Ayer (R. 
242-68, 295-325, 335-351). 
(d) The Health and Welfare of the Residents of 
the Town do not Require that the Discon-
nected Territory Remain a Part of the Town. 
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Much of the record in this case deals with the so-called 
sewer problem, and if we correctly interpret the brief of 
the town, its counsel rely strongly upon the sewer problem 
as grounds for reversal of the decree of the trial court. 
In order to properly understand this problem, it seems 
essential to us to recognize at the outset certain facts on 
which there is no dispute whatever. 
The south boundary line of the town abuts upon a por-
tion of the north boundary line of Salt Lake City. Within 
the disconnected area Salt Lake City owns in fee more than 
five hundred acres of land, an area greater than that em-
braced within the whole town prior to the Annexation of 
April, 1952. The town itself has no sewage system what-
ever. Salt Lake City with its population of over 180,000 
must without interruption dispose of its sewage every hour 
of every day. For many years, and long prior to the or-
ganization of the town, Salt Lake City has disposed of its 
sewage by carrying the same in two . closed conduits to 
points in Sections 11 and 10, at which points the closed 
conduits empty into an open canal which runs west from 
said point in Section 11 about a mile and a quarter where 
it passes under the Jordan River, and runs northerly along 
the west side of the Jordan River until the sewage is dis-
charged into Great Salt Lake. 
There is no doubt that the open sewer canal is un-
sightly. Nor is there any doubt that this method of sewage 
disposal is outmoded and should be replaced with a modern 
treatment plant. Equally clear, however, is the fact that 
until another method of disposal is provided, the one now 
employed must be continued. This inescapable fact cannot 
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be either changed or avoided whether the town annexes the 
territory in question or not. 
The town does not level its attack upon the fact that 
raw sewage is discharged into Great Salt Lake, but rather 
upon the existence of the open sewer canal. About a mile 
and a quarter of this canal is located within the territory 
here involved, while some eight miles extends beyond such 
territory along the Jordan River to Great Salt Lake. The 
town does not suggest that this eight miles of open canal 
be covered or eliminated. So what this case really gets 
down to is a question of what should be done with the one 
and a quarter miles of open sewer canal within the terri-
tory. 
The town relies upon the testimony of its witness Dr. 
Spendlove, who was recalled for further direct examination 
by counsel for the town and testified (R. 495-6) as follows: 
Q Doctor, so I may understand your testimony, 
the sewer, the open ditch sewer, starting here, and 
also the Cudahy open ditch, if they were covered 
by a conduit out in this area for the City to the 
Jordan River, it would lessen the health hazard to 
the people living and working at these industries? 
A May I just confine my statement on that. 
We have assurances that Salt Lake City is going to 
put in a treatment in that ditch, that is covered. We 
recognize a potential hazard, but, on the other hand, 
we would not want to see the City spend one hundred 
thousand, or whatever it costs, to cover that ditch 
that is going to be no longer in use than six months 
or five years from now. We would want to see the 
money spent to the best advantage to provide good 
treatment, taking away the exposure to the people 
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as quickly as possible with the least amount of 
money. 
THE COURT: 
Q Where would the treatment take place? 
A They propose some treatment plants west 
and south of that, I understand, but I don't know 
the exact place. 
Q Somewhere along the open ditch area? 
A No, I think considerable west and south of 
the area. 
MR. HANSON: 
Q To the west and south of the Jordan River? 
A That is my impression. I haven't located 
the area on the rna p. 
THE COURT: 
Q You mean the sewage would run through 
that open ditch before it was treated? 
A No, come in a closed ditch to the treatment 
plant and treated. 
MR. HOLMGREN: At 11th North or West 
and 17th North, your Honor, in Salt Lake Coun-
ty. 
THE COURT: 
Q You would eliminate that open ditch entirely 
in that area? 
A That is my opinion. 
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Q It would be routed in a different way? 
A Yes, that it what I am saying, the ditch 
would have no value if covered at the present time. 
The conclusion of Dr. Spendlove is sensible and proper. 
Surely the only feasible way to solve the sewage problem 
is at the source, before the raw sewage is discharged into 
any open canal or into Great Salt Lake. It is difficult to 
imagine a more foolish or wasteful expenditure than paying 
thousands of dollars in covering a segment of a canal when 
the source of the sewage is unaffected and the remainder 
of the canal is left open. 
Patently then, the answer to the sewage problem was 
not annexation of the territory involved here, but rather 
treatment of the raw sewage. 
Proper treatment involves careful planning, substantial 
expenditure by Salt Lake City and enabling the legislation 
to raise the necessary funds. 
An effort to provide such legislation was made in 
Chapter 21, Laws of Utah, 1953, which was before this 
Court for consideration in the case of Moss v. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 
961. 
What could the town possibly accomplish on this sewer 
problem by annexation? What change could be made? 
What could be done which is not now being done? There 
are some broad general assertions in the evidence, but 
nothing specifically is suggested in either the record or 
the brief. This is so for the simple reason that the prob-
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lem of Salt Lake City's sewage disposal is one wholly out-
side of and unrelated to any questions of annexation. 
There is some evidence in the record concerning the 
drainage through the area in question of the sewage arising 
from the stock yards and the plant of the Cudahy Packing 
Company. The control of this sewage lies at its source. If 
the town had been genuinely concerned with such control, 
it would have annexed the propertly on which it arose. 
Instead, the town elected to exclude such property from 
its corporate limits and create the island area identified 
on the prints attached to this brief. 
By reference again to these maps, it is seen that the 
sewer canal of Salt Lake City occupies a very narrow strip 
in the southerly portion of the premises involved. 
If one were to concede that some annexation were jus-
tified to control this canal, no reason is perceived for the 
necessity of annexing more than five whole sections of land, 
some of it nearly two miles distant from the canal in ques-
tion. 
We have examined all the disconnection cases which 
have come before this Court under the statutes in question. 
They are Young v. Salt Lake City, supra, (1902); Gilmor 
v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932, (1904) ; In re Fulmer, 33 
Utah 43, 92 P. 768, (1906) ; Christensen v. Town of Clear-
field, 66 Utah 455, 243 P. 376, (1926); In re Smithfield 
City, 70 Utah 564, 262 P. 105, (1927); In re Chief Consoli-
dated Mining Company, supra, (1926) ; Plutus Mining Com-
pany v. Orme, et al., 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132, (1930) ; In 
re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 2d 468, (1935) ; and Appli-
cation of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P. 2d 1195, (1937). 
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In none of these where disconnection was decreed were 
the elements of justice and equity stronger than in the case 
at bar. Only in the Mammoth City case (In re Chief Con-
solidated Mining Company) was the decree of disconnec-
tion reversed on the issue of justice and equity. The facts 
in that case, as we have shown, are so essentially different 
from those here presented, that the decision is not in any 
way controlling. 
The excerpts from the Utah cases cited by the town in 
its brief are not particularly helpful in the case at bar, and 
the two Kentucky cases cited therein were decided under 
an entirely different statute. The excerpt from Collins v. 
Town of Crittenden, at page 21 of the town's brief, is, in 
fact, substantially nothing more than a quotation from 
the Kentucky statute, which provides that the court may 
annex lands even against the will of the majority if it finds 
that "a failure to annex * * * will materially retard 
the prosperity of the town and of the owners and inhabi-
tants of the territory sought to be annexed * * * " 
So far as we are able to determine, only two states, 
Utah and Nebraska presently have statutes containing the 
"justice and equity" provisions. For this reason, we have 
not cited cases on this point from outside jurisdictions other 
than Nebraska. A brief consideration of the Nebraska cases 
may, however, be helpful. 
The term "equity and justice" was construed in the 
case of Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 520, 118 N. 
W. 127. This was an action to disconnect 200 acres of land 
from the city having more than 1,000 and less than 5,000 
population. The land was unplatted farm land and it was 
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alleged that it received no benefits in common with the 
platted portion of defendant, and the land was retained in 
the city for revenue purposes. The statute provided, if the 
court find, "that justice and equity require such territory, 
or any part thereof, be disconnected from such city or terri-
tory, it shall enter a decree accordingly." The court held 
the statute constitutional, citing Young v. Salt Lake City 
and other cases, the statutes being essentially alike. 
In defining the term "justice and equity", the court 
says that the statutory section should be construed to mean 
"that whenever unplatted lands within the boundaries of, 
and adjacent to, the corporate limits of such city or village, 
are so situated that they do not have that unity of interest 
with the platted portion thereof (in the maintenance of 
village government), justice and equity dictate that they 
should be excluded therefrom." 
In Kuebler v. City of Kearney, 151 Neb. 698, 39 N. W. 
2d 415, the court says: 
When an action is brought, either under a statute 
or at common law, to remove agricultural lands 
from within the corporate limits of a city or village, 
on the basis that justice and equity require that it 
be disconnected therefrom, it is sufficient to show 
that the lands sought to be removed have no unity 
or community of interest with such city or village 
and receive few, if any, benefits by reason thereof. 
In Runyan v. Village of Ong, 154 Neb. 127, 47 N. W. 2d 
97, the court found that the facts were substantially as 
follows: Plaintiff's land was south of and adjoined the 
railroad right of way on the north. It was bounded on the 
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west by a highway which is an extension of the main street 
of the village. The buildings on the property were 1000 feet 
distant from any building in the direction of the village. 
The land not occupied by buildings was used as pasture. 
It was never platted or subdivided. The business section 
of the village was north of the railroad. No place of busi-
ness was south of the railroad. There were only three resi-
dences south of the railroad that were in the village limits 
and these were all on an east and west road 14. mile south 
of the railroad. The population of the village was 190. 
There was no reason to foresee any extended growth. There 
was no tendency toward business or residence development 
south of the railroad. There were many vacant lots in the 
business section of the village and ample space for any 
contemplated residential needs. There was evidence that 
the village had maintained the roads on the west and south 
of plaintiff's tract in conjunction with the township. There 
was a street light near the southwest corner of plaintiff's 
tract and another near the northwest corner. Electric en-
ergy was supplied to plaintiff's residence by the Consumers 
Public Power District. The village maintained a volunteer 
fire department and a part time village marshal. The police 
and fire protection afforded was negligible. It was plain 
from the record that the plaintiff's land received no more 
benefits from such protection than did adjoining agricul-
tural lands not within the corporate limits of the village. 
The village had no water or sewer systems. No sidewalks 
had been built south of the tracks. The court said : 
We think the evidence shows that the plaintiff's 
tract is rural in character and that its location makes 
it unfavorable for development as an integral part 
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of the village. The evidence clearly shows there is 
no unity or community of interest between the prop-
erty and the village. We fail to find any evidence of 
any material benefit accruing to this land by reason 
of its being within the village. Consequently we 
conclude that justice and equity require that it be 
disconnected from the village. * * * 
Davidson v. City of Revenna, 153 Neb. 652, 45 N. W. 
2d 7 41, involved a tract of 27 acres lying in the northeast 
corner of a city. It was used wholly for agricultural pur-
poses except for one residence in the southwest corner. The 
court said: 
* * * The residence property is connected with 
the city water system and is furnished with electric 
lights from the Consumers Public Power District. 
The closest sewer line is one-half block west of the 
west line of the Hughes tract, the residence being 
about 150 feet east of the west boundary. The clos-
est fire hydrant is one block west of the southwest 
corner of the property. There is no street along the 
west side of the property except for a very short 
distance at the south end. There is no demand for 
any part of the tract for residence lots or other city 
purposes. There is no evidence of the development or 
growth of the city in the general direction of this 
property. It is rural in character and its location 
appears unfavorable to its development as an integ-
ral part of the city. An examination of all of the 
evidence, including the photographs taken at various 
points on this acreage, convinces us that there is 
no community of interest between the property and 
the city of Revenna. While it is true the property 
is benefited by receiving the benefits of city water 
and electric lights, this is not necessarily a control-
ling factor. Other properties outside of the corpor-
ate limits receive similar benefits. But, considered 
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as a whole, justice and equity require that the 
Hughes tract be disconnected from the city. 
* * * That part of the judgment denying relief 
to plaintiffs Hughes is reversed and the cause re-
manded to the District Court with instructions to 
disconnect the Hughes property * * * from the 
city of Revenna. 
In Village of Hartington v. Luge, et al., 33 Neb. 624, 
50 N. W. 957, the village annexed certain lands and under 
a statute brought an action against the landowners of the 
area annexed to have the court confirm the annexation. 
It was alleged that the annexation was made for the pur-
poses of protection from fire, preservation of health, order, 
and cleanliness of said village and for the purpose of rais-
ing the revenue or taxes to help defray the expenses of said 
village, and that said ends would in justice and equity re-
quire the annexation of said territory to said village. It 
was further alleged that other material benefits and ad-
vantages besides those mentioned would be derived from 
such annexation by reason of said territory lying across 
and obstructing the approach and egress of the public and 
the citizens of said village to and from said village to the 
public highways adjacent to said territory. The statute 
provided that if the court found that the territory would 
"receive material benefit by its annexation, or that justice 
and equity require such annexation of said territory," then 
a decree should be made accordingly. The trial court de-
creed annexation. The Supreme Court reversed the same 
saying in part : 
* * * The facts stated in the petition do not 
bring the case within the provisions of the statute. 
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It does not appear that the property sought to be 
annexed would be benefited in any manner what-
ever, nor that justice and equity require such annex-
ation. The principal benefit would be to the village 
by adding to the taxable property therein, but this, 
of itself, is not sufficient. If this action could be 
sustained upon the facts pleaded and proved, then 
the village might annex a whole township or county, 
as such an annexation could be placed upon the same 
grounds as it is sought to predicate this action upon. 
* * * It is not the policy of the law to bring 
large tracts of agricultural land within a municipal 
corporation. In fact there is an inconsistency in so 
doing. The territory of a municipal corporation is 
ordinarily subdivided into lots and blocks, and the 
residents thereon are not supposed to obtain a live-
lihood from the cultivation of the soil. Where it is 
necessary, therefore, to extend the village limits to 
obtain more lots or land that should be divided into 
lots, an action of this kind may be sustained. But 
it cannot be sustained unless the statutory grounds 
exist. 
CONCLUSION 
The power of the district court to deal with the dis-
connection of the territory involved is expressly conferred 
by the statute. This jurisdiction was invoked by a petition 
filed in accordance with its provisions. Disconnection pro-
ceedings are controlled by the rules of civil procedure. 
Under these rules, and the statute, the issue of represen-
tation must be determined by the proof presented when the 
issue is submitted to and determined by the court. In the 
determination of this issue, all parties, interveners and 
original signers stand in the same position. Under the 
application of these propositions, a majority of the real 
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property owners signed the petition for disconnection as 
required by the statute. 
The town conferred no direct or special benefits of any 
substance upon the disconnected territory. It was not nec-
essary for the use of the town, nor will its future growth or 
expansion require such territory. There is no interrelation 
or dependency between the town and the territory involved. 
The sewage problem is not materially related to the 
annexation of the territory in question. The solution of this 
problem depends upon treatment of the raw sewage at or 
near the source. The enclosure of that portion of the open 
sewer within the town would not materially relieve that 
problem, nor was it actually advocated by the witnesses for 
the town. 
The decree of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WESLEY G. HOWELL, 
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
Assistant City Attorney, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
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